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HUMAN CLONING AND THE FAMILY:
REFLECTIONS ON CLONING
EXISTING CHILDREN
Stephen A. Newman*
L Introduction
The prospect of human cloning-a once-fanciful idea that now
must be treated seriously as a future scientific possibility-raises many
issues for social policy makers, not the least of which is whether the
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process ought to be entirely banned. The concern I wish to explore here
is whether clonal reproduction might put too great a strain on the family,
an institution already laboring under the substantial pressures of modern
life.
Recent scientific experiments allow us to imagine how cloning
might be employed as a way to create children. In 1993, scientists at
George Washington University split off individual cells from early
human embryos; with the interventions of the scientists, the separate
cells began growing as separate, genetically identical embryos. The
researchers used abnormal embryos to experiment with, and did not
intend to implant any of the embryos to create human clones.
Assuming further development of this possibility, we can
envision identical embryos implanted simultaneously into a waiting
womb, resulting in multiple identical births. The process would require
one male and one female progenitor, and would resemble a naturally
occurring phenomenon, the birth of identical twins. We can also
imagine identical embryos being frozen, and used at different times to
produce genetically identical children of varying ages.
A 1997 report of the experimental cloning of an adult sheep by
researchers in Scotland introduces a new and startling possibility for
human reproduction. The team of researchers extracted DNA from a
body cell of an adult sheep and removed the nucleus from an unfertilized
egg of another ewe. They inserted the extracted DNA into the egg cell,
which caused the egg to develop into an embryo. Following uterine
implantation (using a surrogate mother sheep), a lamb-the clone of the
DNA-providing animal-was born.
We may now imagine a human clone created from DNA taken
from the cells of an existing adult or an existing child. We can even
posit asexual reproduction by a woman without a man's involvement:
she merely provides her own DNA, her own unfertilized egg, and her
own womb. With the assistance of her own lab technician, she can
provide all the material elements of procreation by herself.
However cloning may be accomplished, serious issues about its
social and moral consequences command our attention. Some
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objections to cloning arise from the possibility of achieving childbirth
with DNA donated-or sold-to strangers. I will confine my discussion
here, however, to situations in which the clone of an existing child
would be created at the behest of at least one parent who intends to raise
the child as her own. I will assume that parental motivations to use
cloning are not unconscionable or disreputable, but deserving of
consideration. For example, some parents may wish to avoid a
significant risk of passing along specific, serious genetically-related
diseases. Others reacting to the tragedy of a dying child may see in
cloning a way to replace that child. As will be seen, whatever the
parental motivation, cloning still poses substantial threats to the well-
being of families and the interests of children.
II. Cloning of Existing Children to Produce Genetically
Identical Children Over Time
Children, though generally unable to articulate, advocate, and
exercise judgment about their interests, nevertheless have critical
interests that deserve respect and recognition. In family life, children's
interests generally do not extend to decision making about the
introduction of new children into the family. The addition of new
children who are clones of an existing child, however, is different in
kind from the ordinary decision about family size that parents
exclusively control.
Unlike the natural birth of siblings, the birth of a later-born clone
is a deliberately taken decision to create an individual with the entire
genome of a living human being. This is much more troubling than
normal sibling birth. The genome is not the sole determinant of human
identity, but it is an essential and critical ingredient. It is a vast part of
ourselves, defining numerous personal characteristics, and we need not
feel compelled to allow something so closely touching upon our sense
of our own personhood to be shared by anyone else. We already have
public opinion surveys which show that most adults, if offered the
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choice, would refuse the chance to be cloned.' Reasonable adults may
regard the prospect of cloning themselves as psychologically unsettling,
morally disturbing, and even bizarre. If this is so, we cannot justify
imposing cloning upon children, who cannot give mature consent to the
decision but who would have to live with its consequences for the rest
of their lives.
It may be claimed that the existence of natural-born identical
twins argues against this position. But the cloning of oneself, once one
is in the world, seems vastly different from the chance simultaneous
birth of genetic twins. Development of personal identity, a sense of
one's individuality, and a sense of one's place in the world are already
progressing or well along in the case of the existing person. All of these
can be profoundly shaken by the notion of a clone, a potential shadow-
self, being brought to life.
These observations are particularly telling in the case of a child,
for then the clone is introduced into the family, the formative context for
building human identity and the site of the most crucial relationships
that pervasively influence who the child is and what he will become. It
may well seem to the existing child that issues of identity, individuality,
and one's place in the family are suddenly and crazily re-shuffled with
the appearance of a clone, with all familial commitments and
understandings previously reached now indefinitely suspended.
Consider a five year old child faced with a newborn clone of
herself. The newborn is likely to get more attention, because infants
naturally need so much care and are expert at winning parental affection
and attention. This may generate jealousy and resentment on the part of
the older child. All this, of course, happens with ordinary siblings. But
can we say matters are not complicated and feelings confused perhaps
exponentially by the inevitable parental remarks over clonal similarities
to the "original" child, and that child's thought that "this is a duplicate of
myself that my parents prefer and that I resent"? The child may well
'When asked "If you had the chance would you clone yourself?.," 91% of the respondents
in a February poll said they would not. Special Report, TIME, Mar. 10, 1997.
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think, or unconsciously sense, that she's being replaced by the younger
version, who is not merely an independent object of parental affection
(i.e., the ordinary sibling), but a better, more worthy, more lovable
incarnation of herself. What would it be like to have a person
resembling your past self being raised along with you, and-in your
childish perception, if not in reality-preferred over you?
Tampering with such fundamental issues for the child as her
developing sense of self worth, her value as an individual, and her place
in the family seems wrong, putting at risk the child's vital interest in
emotional stability and security within the family. Offering the child a
rational explanation of the clone will not suffice here. Children cannot
control their own development with reason. Their reasoning ability
itself needs to develop; children's thinking is a blend of what they know
of reality and their imaginings, fantasies, fears, and imperfect
understandings of what is happening around them and within
themselves. The complexity of family relationships defies conscious
analysis by the participants in any event. Adults as well as children do
not clearly understand their own emotions, motivations and behaviors in
the family setting. It is unrealistic to expect the child to feel reassured,
comforted or consoled by a simplistic "rational explanation" of the clone
as a separate individual who poses no threat to her now or in the future.
Even a child is likely to sense that the truth is infinitely more
complicated than this.
The experience of the young clone growing up with a physically
identical sibling must also be taken into account. This child might have
the feeling that she is not a truly separate individual, but one whose path
has been pre-marked by the "original" version of herself. For her,
footsteps have been laid down; not following them may incur the
disapproval of parents, sibling, teachers, relatives, or others aware of her
clone status. These significant other people in the child's life may also
regard the clone as not a "normal" child but something almost freakish,
someone literally created in the image of another human being. Of
course, we accept naturally occurring identical twins as normal. But the
natural is more readily accepted as normal than the humanly planned
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aberration from the norm. Unless clones are produced in substantial
numbers, they will inevitably be regarded as different, and because
different, abnormal and odd.
This is not simply a matter of prejudice, though prejudice there
will surely be. When the procreative process is diverted from its normal
course, in so radical a way as cloning genetic copies of existing humans,
we make a clone different from the outset of life. We are then
unavoidably tampering with its future development, in ways we cannot
predict. Can we expect, for example, a clone's development of a sense
of personal identity to proceed along normal lines? Intuitively, we
cannot help but see a threat to individuality, to a sense of one's own
uniqueness, to a sense of self-worth, to an independent, well-integrated
personality. We would be tampering with the basic building blocks of
both physical and mental life, in a social experiment that burdens and
puts at risk the existing child and all of her replicas.
III. Cloning an Existing Child
by Taking DNA From the Child
Cloning might make it possible for parents to create a family
with genetically identical children spaced years apart through removal
of genetic material from the body cells of an existing child. The child's
DNA, fused into an unfertilized egg cell of its mother, could then direct
the growth of the child's clone, leading to the birth of a genetically
identical, younger twin. Use of this technique would raise all of the
concerns discussed above, and create another serious objection
stemming from the clonal technique itself.
Cloning of an existing child by transferring DNA from a body
cell of the child is ethically unacceptable because it involves a child in
the process of human procreation. This is so even if it is a simple,
painless procedure to take a cell from the child, and if reproduction then
proceeds in an asexual way. The use of that cell to produce a baby is an
act that makes the child a participant in the reproductive process, a
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process that should be the exclusive domain of adults. A child cannot
take responsibility for the act of reproduction, and should not be
burdened with the knowledge that he has been used for such a purpose.
Involving the child, however much or little, in a procreative act with its
own mother is to cross a barrier between mother and child that must
remain absolute and unbreachable.
IV. Cloning to Replace a Dying Child
It is sometimes suggested that a clone could be created by
parents to replace a dying child. This is a variant of the notion that
American know-how can solve any ills we have, but it is a sorely
misguided and simplistic "solution" to a tragic family event. The
proffered solution misses the basic point that people are irreplaceable.
Parents motivated by the desire to re-create a lost child would soon be
confronted with the fact that the new child is not the same as the child
they lost. Differences between the two would be produced by a complex
mix of non-genetic factors, including differences in brain development
after birth, in parenting (the same parents might be profoundly changed
after experiencing the death of a child), in relationships with extended
family and friends, and in school, community, and cultural
environments. Just as identical twins are separate individuals, with
separate personalities and separate experiences of life, the "replacement"
child would be a separate being from the dead or dying child.
If re-creation of the dying child is a fantasy, we are then led to
ask: what happens when the parents' dream of identity fails? Will
parents struggle against the child's development of a unique self-identity,
in an effort to make the replacement as much like the original as
possible? Will the child be burdened with the knowledge that he was
created in the image of a dead child, whom he closely resembles but
cannot really replace? The sight of the replica-child will be a powerful
reminder of the dead child; the parents may feel haunted by the loss of
the first child as they live with its look-alike replacement. Indeed, as a
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stimulus to thoughts of the tragic loss and to the many
emotions-sorrow, hopelessness, bitterness, anger-associated with the
death, the "replacement" child risks becoming more associated in a
parent's mind with death, than with new life.
Bereaved parents deserve our greatest sympathy. Some, in their
grief, might wish to turn to cloning techniques to enact their child
replacement dream. But cloning in this situation, instead of providing
relief, threatens to further disorient the parents and to distort the
fundamental relationship between parent and child. Policy makers,
however sympathetic to such parents' plight, need not approve a radical
human replicative technology in order to allow suffering parents to
create a fantasy "replacement" child.
V. Conclusion
Existing children should be protected from the lifelong,
unpredictable and potentially troubling consequences of cloning. Most
adults would find cloning themselves morally and psychologically
disturbing; such a choice cannot be made for and imposed upon
children. Introducing a child's clone into the family, the place where the
existing child must develop his personal identity, sense of self-worth,
and human individuality, threatens the child's development in ways the
family cannot be expected to understand or to effectively manage.
Cloning of a dying child seems a perhaps understandable but
foredoomed attempt to re-create the lost child. It would unfairly burden
the "replacement" child and distort its vital relationship with the parents.
Those who see no objection to the cloning of existing children
need to give this potential method of reproduction a hard, and careful,
second look.
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